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A Voice Of Afro-American Opinion 
Vol. 4 No. 3 April-May, 1975 
U. S. Intervention In Chile 
In President Ford's admission and 
arrogant defense of the United States' 
subversive role in the fascist coup which 
overthrew the elected Allende govern-
ment in Chile, he characterized the 
tragedy as being "in the best interest of 
the Chilean people, and certainly of the 
United States". This flagrant example of 
the aggressive nature of U.S. foreign 
policy has ended many illusions about 
the purpose of U.S. "involvement" in the 
developing countries . 
Friends of Africa are especially alarmed 
because many of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and State Department operat-
ives, their hands steeped in the blood of 
the Chilean people , have since been 
reassigned to African posts. Among these 
are Nathaniel Davis. ambassador to Chile 
during the 1973 bloody coup and now 
assigned by Kissinger to be Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs. 
Dean Hinton, a specialist in economic 
intelligence, Director of AID (Agency of 
International Development) in Chile 
(1969-1971) and a member of the Na-
tional Securitv Council Subcommittee on 
"Nationalization of U.S. Companies" 
abroad, has become ambassador to Zaire. 
Frederick Latrash. the AID official who 
helped bring down the Arbenz govern-
ment in Guatemala in 1954, undermined 
the Nkrumah government in Ghana in 
1966 and served as the Political Director 
of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago in 1971 , 
has been reassigned to Africa. Also 
William Bowdler, a member of the 
National Security Council and known for 
his CIA activities in Latin America, has 
been appointed ambassador to South 
Africa. 
Before 1970 
U.S. intervention in Chile began long 
before the POPULAR UNITY COALI-
TION (UP) began to successfully chal-
lenge the U.S. role in Chile. After UP won 
the executive branch of the Chilean 
government , U.S. covert penetration in 
Chile became more complete. In the 
economic sphere, a merging of the 
native Chilean monopolies with the U.S. 
based multinational corporations deve-
loped . Even physical mergers were ref-
lected in the often An51o names of the 
big Chilean bourgeoisie. For example, a 
member of the "Edwards family " (an 
important Chilean capitalist family whose 
fraudulent banking practices were ex-
posed by the UP government) fled to the 
U.S. where he became vice-president of 
Pepsi-Cola. In 50 years U.S. monopolies 
extracted over $10 billion from Chile, 
fully one half of all the wealth Chile had 
produced in 400 years. 
Cultural penetration was especially 
prominent - many radio stations were 
totally devoted to U.S. music and TV was 
completely dominated by U.S. programs. 
One of the most popular UP measures 
was to require a minimum percentage of 
Chilean programs on the radio, giving 
rise to a great resurgence of Chilean 
culture. 
U.S. interference in Chilean politics 
has been confirmed by the testimony of 
CIA Director William F. Colby at the 
House Armed Services Committee. Back 
in 1964. $3 million in CIA funds was 
poured into the Christian Democrats 
Party which narrowly defeated Salvador 
All£:nde for the presidency. No doubt 
this sum of money, which was huge by 
Chilean standards, was decisive in the 
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History of the Popular 
Front Movement in Chile 
From 1939 to the election of Salvador 
Allende in 1970, the Popular Front Move-
ment had gone through many coalitiom 
without having the real support of the 
masses of the Chilean people. It was not 
until 1970 that the Popular Front, under 
the leadership of Allende, had the full 
support of the Chilean people. 
The history of the development of the 
Popular Front Movement starts during 
World War I when the demand for 
Chile\ nitrates and copper reached 
unprecedented heights. The subsequent 
growth of mining , manufacturing, and 
commerce led in turn to an enlarged 
industrial proletariat . . 
The depression nf tne 1930s created 
the objective conditions for the radicali-
zation of this emerging proletarian class. 
According to the League of Nations, 
Chile was hit harder ty :he effects of the 
Great Depression than any other nation 
in the world. Sale of copper and nitrates. 
upon which Chile had depended for 
more than 70 percent of its national 
income, declined from $27 million in 
1929 to about $3.5 million in 1932. 
Between October 1929 and October 1930 
imports fell 88 percent. Moreo,er, sala-
ries declined, and the cost of staples rose 
drastically. 
As the Communists and Socialists 
attempted to represent the interest of the 
proletariat, the Radical Party became the 
party of the middle-sectors. The Radical 
Partv had been in existence since the 
mid~nineteenth century. Although by 
the 1930s the Party had become asso-
ciated with the rising urban middle-
sector, it had the broadest class base of all 
the Chilean parties. Side br side within 
this party were landed proprietors, weal-
thy mine-owners, merchants, teachers, 
civil sen:•ants. artisans and other strata oi 
the middle-class. The multi-interest base 
of this party tended to give it a centrist 
character. 
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Chile's Experience and Problems Of The Class Struggle 
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All the c:rucial questions of struggle for 
the implementation of profound tram-
formations and transition to socialism are 
being vigorously di~cussed in connection 
with the militar~·-fascist coup in Chile. Of 
course, it is up to the Chilean comrades 
10 draw exhaustive conclusions about the 
experience of the Popular Unity govern-
ment and about the causes of its defeat , 
and they already have made the first 
steps in this direction. 
But the experience of the events in 
Chile is not of national importance alone. 
It is important for the entire international 
workers ' and Communist movement. As 
is known, most Communist Parties in 
capitalist countries are exponents of the 
revolution's peaceful development. The 
events in Chile introduce many new 
elements into the substantiation of the 
revolution's development in a peaceful 
form . For this reason the Communist 
Parties strive to draw conclusions from 
the brutal lessons of the revolution 's 
defeat in Chile. 
At the same time the gloating ultra-
Leftist elements, organizations of the 
Maoist type and the Trotskyites are 
sacrilegiously trying to use the Chilean 
revolution 's tragedy for increasing their 
meager theoretical baggage. There have 
already appeared qu ite a few articles in 
which these extremists expound rather 
expertly about the erroneousness of the 
very idea of transition to socialism by 
peaceful means, and about the correct-
ness of their own adventuristic concepts. 
Thus, Krivine, one of the leaders of 
French Trotskyites, openly declares : 
"Peaceful roads of transition to socialism 
end up with bloodbaths." 
Pseudo-scientific talk about the causes 
of the coup in Chile can be encountered 
also in the bourgeois press, which pre-
sents the Allende government 's policy in 
a distorted, slanderous manner and holds 
it responsible for all the difficulties in the 
country . 
Bourgeois ideologists try to prove the 
incompatibility of socialism and democ-
racy : the impossibility of social progress 
with in the framework of socialism in 
general and along the roads of peaceful 
development in particular. They contend 
that the struggle for socialism will inevita-
bly be accompanied by fierce civil wars 
and blood shed, by brute force and 
countless sacrifices, economic discloca -
lion and a worsening of the living 
standards of the popular masses . For this 
rea son , they \ay , it is betlt>r to suffer the 
harthhips inherent in bourgeois relations 
than to accept senseless '>i!C rifi<es and 
l, lo, •<h ill' d in thl' n.imv of i llu,ory hup l·, . 
Tliv ideulut-:i,b o! tfw IJourgl'oi~ie stri vP 
to cfotH'dit lhe very idea of sociali~m in 
the mind, of the masses as allegedly 
destru ctive bv its verv nature. 
So the e~ents i~ Chile attract the 
att ention of tht> most diverse political 
forces . and numerous demagogic specu-
lations about the Chilean tragedy are 
appearing. For this reason, while empha-
sizing the priority right of Chilean com-
rades to determine the causes and study 
the genesis of the military-fascist coup, 
Marxists in other countries strive to take 
part in the theoretical analysis of the 
problems and prospects of struggle for 
democracy and socialism in the light of 
the Chilean experience. 
The international importance of 
Chile 's experience stems from the fact 
that it focuses many problems of struggle 
for the peaceful transition to socialism 
that are common to many other parties 
and countries. The tendencies of class 
struggle and pol itical life in Chile ref-
lected in a concentrated form the con-
temporary stage in the world revolution-
ary process, the logic of its development, 
the conlemporary manifestations of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the working 
class movement, sober calculations and 
the illusions and delusions that have not 
yet been overcome. 
All this means that the essence of 
Chile 's experience can be correctly 
understood only in the context of the 
common problems facing the interna-
tional workers ' and Communist move-
ment . Lenin's teaching on imperialism 
and his theory of the socialist revolution 
are the key to the analysis of the main 
questions of the development of class 
struggle at the contemporary stage, of 
the experience and lessons of the 
Chilean revolution, as well as Lenin 's 
methodology, which shows that the 
correctness of an analysis is ensured first 
of all by a deeper penetration into the 
constantly developing dialectics of inter -
connection between the international 
and the national. 
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at th e pr ec;e nt ,t.ige of cla s, str uggle the 
question of perfect ing the entire system 
of political guidance. of raising its scien-
tifi c level and tactical effectiveness i '> one 
of the crucial probl ems of the world 
revolutionary process. A deep study of all 
aspects of Chile 's experience will make ii 
possible to expand the theoretical and 
politica l knowledge of the revolutionary 
vanguard . 
Most contributors to the foreign press 
devote their articles about Chile mostly 
to a search for errors and miscalculations 
in the government's activities , whi ch are 
purported to constitute nearly the sole 
cause of defeat. This point of view is one-
sided . 
Correct conclusions from the experi-
ence of the Chilean events can be drawn 
only on condition of a synthetically 
integral study of the process of the 
revolution's development from victory to 
defeat. Such a study includes : a) a 
generalization of all the new creative 
elements that have been introduced by 
the theory and practice of the Commun-
ist Party of Chile into the teaching of the 
revolution ; b) a sober analysis of the 
alignment and real correlation of class 
forces at various phases of the revo lu-
tion's development ; c) the real mistakes 
and miscalculations made by the Popular 
Unity government. In its documents the 
Communist Party of Chile admits to the 
existence of such mistakes. In it s Appeal 
to the People of October 11 , 1973, it says 
that in the three years of the Popular 
Unity government 's stay in power " im-
portant transformations have been car-
ried out but serious mistakes have also 
been made." 
The creative approach to the main 
tasks, to the alignment of class forces and 
the possibilities of thei r regrouping at the 
first strategic stage of the revolution is an 
important achievement of the Commun-
ist Party of Chile. 
The Communist Party clearl y deter-
mined 1he direction of the movement 's 
main blow : against U.S. imperialism 
which held sway in the country; against 
loca l latifundists , who have merged with 
the Yankees and local monopoly capital ; 
against local monopo ly capital, which is 
connect ed with Ameri can capital and the 
loca l lat ifundists. 
A revolutionary , constructive platform 
of struggle was elaborated on the basis of 
this concept. It was accepted by the 
parties forming the Popular Unity coali-
tio n that had come into being on the 
initiative of the Communist Party . The 
Communist Party ,md the Socialist Party 
reMhed agreement on unity of action 
and thic; tonsiderabl y raised the fi~htin~ 
(1 onti11111•c/ on f)Jg<' 3/ 
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standing on a hi gher ur ~J~ iz.itional len:> I, 
it de monstrated its dbil :ty tu bec o me the 
hC"cPmonic class and came o ut as the 
m:i.in mot i\'e fo rce of the revolu t ionar\· 
trJmformations . 
The correct identificat ion of priority 
tasks of struggle accorded with the 
interests of the broadest segments of the 
nation : the peasants , craftsmen, small 
industrialists and merchants, the working 
inte lligentsia. 
In developing the struggle for the anti-
imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution the 
Communist Party of Chile proceeded 
from the assumption that a national crisis 
was maturing in the country as a result of 
the aggravation of all the contradictions 
inherent in Chilean society. 
First of all , contradictions between the 
nation and U.S. imperialism had become 
aggravated late in the 1960s and anti-
imperialist sentiments became extremely 
widespread. 
Secondly, there was a considerable 
aggravation of the crisis of the soci_al 
structures of Chilean society. The drop in 
production , the growth of inflation, mass 
unemployment, growing poverty of 
working people and economic disloca-
tion - all this pointed to the obsoles-
cence and corruption of social relations 
and their antipopular essence. There was 
also an aggravation of contradictions 
between the masses and the monopolist-
latifundist upper crust. 
Thirdly, there was a serious aggravation 
of the political crisis, and the inability of 
the ruling classes to administer the 
country using the old methods became 
manifest. This was a crisis of bourgeois 
reformism, of which President Frei's 
policy was an embodiment. 
The ruling classes found themselves in 
isolation. A crisis of Chilean society's 
political structure set in . The content and 
nature of the nation-wide political crisis 
were determined by the sum total of all 
these crisis phenomena. 
Proceeding from a profound analysis 
of the alignment of class forces in the 
country, the historical traditions of the 
country and the specificities of the 
national crisis, the Communist Party of 
Chile evolved a concept of peaceful 
accomplishment of an anti-imperialist, 
anti-oligarchic agrarian revolution with a 
subsequent transition to socialism, and 
outlined the political measures required 
for the attainment of this task. In the 
Party's opinion the greatest possibilities 
for a peaceful solution of the main 
question of the revolution - the ques-
tion of power - were offered by presid-
ential elections because victory in them 
opens up the road to executive power. 
The Communist Party of Chile and the 
Popular Unity coalition adopted this 
program, set course at taking over exe-
cutive power and scored victory. 
The phase of revolutionary socio-
'"!.- 1; ' 
1. ,·;! :tw p,,·,; r;;m ( }i the Popula r L':iit , 
cu.il ltio n twcan after 1he forniation of the I 
,\! l(•nde gm~ernmc: nt. These transforma- ·. j 
tions we re carried out vv ith in th e frame- l 
1-vork of the Co nst it u1 ion and existing ! 
legi,lat io n. The Alle-nde government 
scored really tr e mendous historic suc-
cesses and enriched the theo ry and 
pract ice of the p eaceful deve lopment of 
the revolution , 
Major socio-economic undertakings 
were carried out within a short period of 
time : the natural resources and the 
mining industry were nationalized (cop-
per, saltpeter, coal, iron ore) , a number 
of industrial companies and the banking 
system were socialized ; control was 
established over foreign trade; the 
estates of big landowners were expropri-
ated and latifundism was actually liqui-
dated; peasants were allotted land and 
new cooperative and state forms of 
agrarian production were set up; a state 
sector of the economy was created and 
considerably expanded; the wages of 
workers, civil servants and servicemen 
were raised. 
When assessing such measures as the 
nationalization of natural resources , for-
eign monopolies and a number of local 
companies, the socialization of most 
banks and the establishment of control 
over foreign trade, that resulted in the 
forming of the State sector, it is necessary 
to bear in mind that they were carried 
out at the stage of the democratic 
revolution and at the same time they 
considerably deepened the revolution , 
furthered it, carried it beyond the frame-
work of democratic transformations and 
created the embryo of socialism. Chile's 
experience showed again that precisely 
such is the dialectics of the development 
of any democratic revolution in present 
conditions. It is no longer possible to 
ignore this conclusion when working out 
the strategic aims of the democratic stage 
of struggle in any country. 
The big victories of the Popular Unity, 
its outstanding achievements in the 
political and socio-economic fields were 
the first , very substantial contribution to 
the creation of a people's state, the first 
steps along the road to socialism. 
But the logic of struggle, naturally , 
demanded a further advance, a deep-
ening of transformations, transition to 
the solution of new tasks. In this context, 
I believe, there is reason to say that the 
democratic stage of the revolution con-
sists of two phases, each of which has its 
strategic orientation, its political and 
economic tasks, its specificity as regards 
the alignment of forces. 
The extremely urgent need of solving 
the following inter-connected crucial 
problems emerged for Chile at this 
ph ase : the political - the solution of the 
question of power; the economic - the 
organization of the normal functioning 
of economic life in cond iti ons of cardinal 
(continued on page 8) , 
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The Reverend Benjamin Chavis , of the 
United Church of Christ 's Commission 
on Racial Justice, and h is co-defendants 
known as the Wilmington, N.C. Ten need 
our active support to ensure that they are 
not railroaded to prison for an outra-
geous combined sentence of 282 year.. 
on trumped-up false charges by the 
North Carolina authorities. The Wilming-
ton Ten case is one of the most blatant 
examples of the intensified racist and 
political repression in this country. Once 
again, the victims of violence have been 
portrayed as the perpetrators. 
In 1972, the Wilmington Ten were 
convicted of arson , conspiracy to assault 
emergency personnel and criminal re-
sponsibility for damages resulting from 
•the 4-day Klu Klux Klan and Rights of 
White People vigilante attack on them in 
1971 . The Wilmington Ten defendants 
:Were actually defending a church in 
Wilmington's Black community fr-om the 
racist and violent seige by the vigilantes . 
Recently, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals refused to grant the Wilmington 
Ten a new trial. This gross injustice was 
handed down despite the well-
documented defense argument that 
there had been blatant miscarriage of 
justice, and despite the evidence that 
large secret payments were paid to two 
informers to testify against Rev. Chavis. 
The defense attorneys are taking the case 
before the North Carolina Supreme 
Court; the case will be reviewed in June. 
The African American Solidarity Com-
mittee joins the National Alliance Against 
Racism and Political Repression and all 
progressive people in demanding that 
the case be overturned and that the 
persecution of Rev. Ben Chavis and the 
Wilmington Ten be halted! 
Most importantly, we urge you to write 
or wire the Hon. Rufus Edmisten, Anor-
ney General , Raleigh, North Carolina 
27602, and petition him to join the 
defense before the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in asking that the case be 
overturned. At the very least , he must 
move for a new trial. Copies of petitions 
for the Wilmington Ten can be obtained 
from the NAARPR, 150 Fifth Ave. Room 
804, New York , N.Y. 10010, telepho ne 
(212) 243-8555. 
United, the people can never be de-
feated . 
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The Fascist Coup and the 
World Crisis of Imperialism 
The fascis1 roup in Chil e took plac.e in 
tht' co nl ex t of the world crisis of capital-
ism . It was 1estimony to the increa~ing 
inability of the multinational and local 
monopolies 10 impose their plans on 
socie1y without viola1ing democratic 
norms. It clearly confirmed the fact 1hat 
the oligarchy and imperialism do not 
hesita1e to establish tyrannv to preserve 
their privileges. The coup reflect ed the 
growing weakness of the capitalist 
system , its historical decline. 
The fascist coup is in striking contradic-
tion to the march of history in our time. 
The trend of historical development is 
not determined by events like those that 
shook our country on September 11, 
1973. Although the fascists achieved 
temporary success in our country, hu-
man ity is irresistibly moving towards the 
triumph of peace, democracy and socia l-
ism . 
The world balance has changed funda-
m enta lly in favour of the forces of 
progress. This is reflected more and more 
in such international organizations as the 
Uni1ed Nations and the O rga nizatio n of 
American States . where imperialist for-
ces, and in particular L.: .S. imperialism, 
are finding themse lves increasingly iso-
lated. 
All this is taki ng place at a tim e when 
imperialism is experiencing its most 
serious economic crisis since World War 
II , while the socialist community is 
registering ever greater economic and 
political achievements, th ereby demon-
strating to the whole world th e advan-
tages of the new sys1em which knows no 
crises and is sreadilr forging ahead. 
The Majority of the Population 
Suffers from the Military Junta 
and its Policy 
The fascists sta nd for the adoption of 
the economic model imposed from 
without which is designed to turn Chile 
into a country with a high concentration 
of monopoly capital, low wages and 
super-exploitation of the working class , a 
country open to penetration by foreign 
capital, they console themselves with the 
illusion of economic development. 
Owing to the plight of the wage 
earners the demand for goods has shar-
ply declined, and this results in the 
impoveri,hment of the va ;t majority of 
the ,mall ,md medium-brar: ke1 proprie-
tors. The position of the ov.-ners of trucks 
and taxis , shopkeepers and small manu-
f a(lurn, . farmers and proff:ssionals, the 
very st rilta which the put\chi<,ts used as 
the instrumf'. nts of thei r , 'Jnspiracy, i\ 
... '{ . 
d(•tL•f i(,r .i t ing ir u m d J\ 10 d ,1\ , ,l!l d '-<1111(' 
o f 1hr·m JrP thr, ·;i: c-n c·d with ruin . 
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,t ,indiird, oi tht' Chilc,,rn pPopit-, .1 u~t>J 
:::>y th P policy of the junta give~ rne to 
resiqance, true, in manv Cil~e~ muted, 
but c lea rl y ex tend ing to ·the majorit\· of 
1he population . The nightmare of the 
incessant ~oaring of prices weighs down 
on millions of men and women. 
\\ e sE>e blows struck at the working 
clas,. the pcasan1s, office workers. all 
wage and salar~ earners. The present 
rulers are seeking to bring abou1 the 
bankruptcy of non-monopoly propr ie-
tors. All these sect ions are moving farth er 
and farther awa y from the junta . al-
though originally many of them looked 
to it with approval and hope. 
The dissociation from the junta is 
beginning to take an open form among 
those sections of the working people 
who were deceived into supporting the 
anti-democratic manoeu vres which 
paved the way to the coup. This applies 
to the workers of the copper industry 
who today demand the conclusion of 
collective bargaining agreements and the 
restoration of the income leve l that 
exi'iled in 1973, i .e., under the popular 
unity government, prior to the unfortu-
nate strike financed by the CIA . 
\.\'hat is h;ippening in the Chri-tian 
Democratic Part y is particularly indicat-
ive. The fascis t government has subjected 
the CDP to systematic hounding. The 
totalitarian concept rules out the exis-
tence of an y democratic organization, 
even when it stands predominantl y for 
the interest of the bourgeosie . Complete 
rejection of democracy in any form 
accords with the essence of fasci~m . that 
political expression of monopoly capital -
ism which means the subordination of all 
of society to the interests of the minorit y. 
The policy of repression hits at the 
majority of the population , though in 
varying degrees; it is particularly savage 
towards revolutionaries, but it affects all 
democrats. 
The Conditions Exist 
for Building the Broadest Movement 
of Anti -Fascist Unity 
As th e May 1. 1974, appeal of the 
Popular Unity Politi ca l Committee sa id , 
" Chile is faced with a great challenge to 
which there can be only one answer : the 
establishment of a broad anti-fascist front 
of all the men , women and you•h of our 
country, a front capable of overthrowing 
the dictatorship , creating a regenerated 
democracy and return ing, with the sup-
port of the majority of the people, to the 
road of revolutionary change." Thi s front 
is open to all patriots; it excludes only the 
ol,g,trc hy, the fascists and the collabora-
tionists . 
The prespnf situarion ha, reaffirmed 
the· vitality of '>ori ali<,r-Communi<,t unity 
' . , 
l,fH ~8 
a, M 1 e•,ent1al c·xrir<·\,ion c,f th!' un it\ ul 
th!' wc,rking cla ,,. a unit ) rhat has 
\ ' 11 H't~Pd and !,!<l in (·'d , tr(' rit:lh in thf> 
cou r~·c, of protracted ,t ruggl t:~ and cum-
mon expe r ience. It pre,uppo ses also the 
, trPncthPning of Popular Unit, as an 
ex pre~~ion of the desi re on th e p.irt 01 
the more conscious section of the popu-
lation to join forces. At the sa me time it is 
projected further to joint ac1ion and 
unit y with the ot her ,ections of the 
population which did no1 support the 
popular government but suffer today 
from the tyranny of the dicta1orship. 
These <,ections, organizations and parties 
should 1ake part in the Anti-Fa!>cist Front 
with equal rights and obligations . 
The Communist Party openly addresses 
th e Christian Democrats inviting them to 
consider these propositions . 
There is of course much that divided 
and still divides the Marxists and the 
Christi.in Democrats, but we also have 
common interests. and the his1ory of our 
country has conclusively shown us that 
whenever we have succeeded in acting 
together and achieving unity on what is 
most important , the country and the 
people have derived concrete benefit 
therefrom. 
Unity is the imperative of thP moment. 
The achievement of unit y will be the first 
vi crory over all 1he instiga tors of enmity 
and division past and prese nt. 
The Chilean Communists have stressed 
that they visualize the Anti-Fascist Front as 
a· r'novement capable of giving the coun-
try a government including all the forces 
belonging to the Front. " The end objec-
tive of the Anti-Fascist Front the creation 
of which the popular for ces stand for is 
the overthrow of the dictatorship, the 
abolition of the to1alitarian . police state it 
has established, and the building of a 
new lawful. democratic , anti-fascist , na-
tional, popular. pluralistic state able to 
ensure democratic renewal and the 
n>mplete eradication of fa scism, to carry 
out revolutionary changes and achieve 
national independence. '' The character 
of thi, sta te will be finallv determined on 
th e basis of the com~on views of all 
participants in the Front and, naturally 
taking into account the finest trad itions 
and democratic achievements of our 
people. 
We shall only repeat 1hat among the 
men in military uniform we distinguish 
between the fascists and the non-fascists, 
between the torturers and 1hose who 
refuse to be party to criminal practices, 
between the honest and the dishonest , 
between the promoters of the conspiracy 
and thP dee eived. Th e signs are that a 
little more than y<'ar afrer the betrayal 
c>ngincert>d by a group of senior offin•rs 
thne is a growing rPlunance in the ranb 
of the army to continue acting as the 
guardians of the rich ,ind jailers of the 
• . ...,, * 
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po or , J~ th e exc·cutIoncr, ot the ir own 
rwoplP . 
Th ,- i wnplt· rnu q tw ,H In mind that 
d(lml·\ tic rPJction and imperiali~m Jre 
devi~ing reserve strategems with a view 
to th e ro, sible replacement of the junta 
bv a not her government while preserving 
their privileges. In working towards this 
end . r(•action above all seeks to isolate 
the Communist Party in order to weaken 
and d ewo y the popular movement. 
The struggle for anti-fascist unity is 
therefore also a struggle against all 
reacti ,rnary or concilliatory ways out of 
the present situation, against all attempts 
to prevent the working class and other 
more conscious sections of the people 
from playing the responsible role that 
belongs to them in the future of Chile. 
Only through the broadest unity can the 
way be barred to any such alternative 
involving in the final analysis the division 
of the people in the interests of their 
enemies. 
For this reason the only truly patriotic, 
popular alternative presupposes the 
creation of a far broader coalition than 
Popular Unity, a coalition that would 
include all political, social. religious and 
military organizations and individuals 
determined to put an end to the dictator-
ship . This is the key task which every 
patriot should help to carry out. 
Mass Work Remains Decisive 
The decisive, vitally necessary precon-
dition for the building of anti-fascist 
unity is work among the masses . No 
tactics can take the place of this work, 
which is the guarantee of victory. There is 
no way whatsoever out of the present 
situation except through action by the 
masses . Victory depends on their partici-
pation. 
The Anti-Fascist Front will be built 
mostly from below, at the level of the 
popular organizations, where the people 
live. work , study or spend ' their leisure 
time. It is here that the revolutionaries 
must work to unite the majority and help 
it achieve its aspirations , the realization 
of which depends in the final analysis on 
the type of government at the head of 
the country. 
It is the prime duty of all anti-fascists to 
belong to mass organizations . Fascism 
seeks to prevent all manifestations of 
independence on the part of the Chilean 
people 's public organizations. In its 
effort s to turn the country into a military 
barracks it is trying to nush all democ-
ratic act ivitv. 
Clc>arly , the majority of the people do 
not accc'pt the state of affairs created by 
the rolicy of the junta and fc>el that it 
cannot last. Bur it is also obvious that 
m:im· are unclear about thc> vvay out. 
Onlv if the advancc>d patriob take part in 
the v,:ork of the mass organi1atiom_ will it 
t>(' pc,\, ibl c• tu guid t·. or g,rniH• ,rncJ un itP 
thP ma«, p~ , o a, to huild up ,uffi cipnt 
:-, ill'll ~t h t(1 chsfp~Jt !hf' d1 ct;! l(Jl ~h ip. 10 -
worl<. tor virt CH} wit ho ul rt·cour~l' to 
reek.le~, actions. Neediess to sav , in the 
conditions of the dict atorship it - is more 
diificult to conduct active work among 
the masses than it was before . Nevethe-
les s. although the forms of struggle must 
now be different , the usurpers are pow-
erle ss to pr eve nt legal activity by the 
revoluti o nari es and all democrat s in the 
popular organizations . in the struggle to 
resolve the problems confronting the 
people. 
The most important thing today is the 
restoration of trade union rights, primar-
ily the right to put forward demands and 
to strike. Many trade unions have won 
wage increases over and above the limits 
allowed by the junta. A number of 
federations are insisting on their right to 
participate in the drafting of the pro-
posed reforms of the Labour Code, social 
security system, and the social status of 
enterprises, resisting the fascist junta's 
attempts to decide these questions with-
out the participation of the parties con-
cerned. 
Another essential aspect of work 
among the masses is the illegal, under-
ground activity of the anti-fascist organi-
zations and the people in general. Legaf 
and illegal work constitute a single whole 
and must complement each other . Only 
through clandestine organization can the 
character of the junta , its crimes and anti-
national actions be publicly exposed, its 
obscurantist ideology combated , and the 
possibility preserved, despite the difficult 
conditions, of guiding, organizing and 
uniting the numerous popular actions. 
Clandestine work will be the more 
effective and significant the closer it is 
linked with the struggle waged by the 
broad masses, and especially if it is 
conducted with and by the masses. 
The popular movement must reject the 
path of terror , of action by small groups , 
of adventurism. To tc:Ke this path would 
mean playing into the hands of fascism . 
The year of domination by the oppress-
ors has shown that the dictators would 
like to impel the popular movement 
1; w • .irds actions of this order . since this 
would give them a pretext to seize upon 
to justify their crirr'!'- . 
It is essential to preve,,t the emer~ence 
and spread of tpnclPncies passively to 
wait for a nonexistent solutiur, to be 
served up from 5-omewhere ,w,·· ,nd the 
bound~ of the mass movement. The junta 
i~ snrt•,Hlin~ rumours about the establish-
ment ot a guvernment in exile and the 
formation of armed gt'3ups outside the 
country with the object of taking over 
power. The main purpose of this inven-
tion is to discredit the powerful interna-
tional solidarity movement a~ " interven-
tioni~rn " , and also to doom th e po pular 
mJ~~e~ to inactivity , to induce 1hem 
p.h ,iH•h to ,ubmit to thP exploitati o n 
and abuses and wait for the " grpat day " 
or "great action" that would allegedly 
change the slate of affairs. 
Needless to say, the great day of 
people 's triumph will come, but it will 
come only if the millions of Chileans 
wage a mass struggle within the country , 
if an organized character is imparted to 
1he protest actions everywhere an1 : a!i 
patriot s are united in the Anti-Fascist 
Front. 
Luis Corvolan, jailed general MCNtary of 
tl!t Chi~n Communist Party. . 
Many of the former patriotic suppor-
ters of the Allende government are now 
in the fascist jails of General Pinochet. 
With U.S. support, the fascist junta is 
preparing to massacre Communist, So-
cialist , Christian Democrats and all other 
people who were in the Allende govern-
ment. Luis Corvalan , General Secretary of 
the Chilean Communist Party, and others 
such as Carlos Matus, Jose Cademartori, 
Daniel Vergara, Fernando Flores, Anibal 
Palm and 180 other political prisoners 
face the real possibility of losing their 
lives. The time is now for all progressive 
forces to demand their freedom. The 
time is now to protest and work for their 
lives and their freedom. Immediate 
protests (telegrams especially) must be 
directed to President Ford or Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger. Protests should 
also be sent to the : Chilean Embassy, 
1730 Massachusetts Ave. N.W ., Wash., 
D .C. 20036 - (202) 785-1746 or to Kurt 
Waldheim, Secretary General of the 
United Nations, New York, New York 
10017 - (212) 754-1234. 
RACISM and REPRESSION! 
1·/ioven1e;;n ln Chile 
Popular Front - 1939 
As a result of the intensification of the 
social struggle brought abo ut by th e 
l'cono mic crisis. the Radical Porty began 
to adopt a more moderate le ftist posi-
tion . This was due , on the one hand , to 
the reforming zeal of the Party 's lower 
middle classes who had been hardest hit 
by the economic crisis. On the other 
hand, it was an attempt by the Radical 
leade rship to circumvent the ris ing mili-
tancy of the proletariat . This move tow-
ard the left allowed for the development 
of Chile's first Popular Front government 
in 7939. The Front, was a coalition 
between the Communist, Socialist and 
Radical parties. For the first time in Chile, 
leaders from the parties of the center-left 
and left worked together to defeat the 
candidate of the oligarchy. The Front's 
presidential candidate, Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda, a radical, won a close election and 
then struggled until his death in 1941 to 
realize the Front's promises to the nation. 
This was an almost impossible task , since 
he presided over an uneasy alliance and 
was blocked at each step by a congress 
controlled by conservatives. The Front 
proposed numerous reforms. The one 
implemented most successfully was the 
formation of the National Development 
Corporation (CORFO) which was de-
signed to stimulate and finance industrial 
development. In the end, CORFO was 
used by the state to promote partial 
industrialization beneficial to the capital-
ist class. 
The 1939 government was only the first 
in a series of popular front governments 
which were to appear in Chile from that 
time to the 1950s. In 1942, after the 
unexpected death of Aguirre, the Front 
joined hands to elect a well-known, anti-
communist leader in the Radical Party, 
Juan Antonio Rios . These popular front 
coalitions continued to remain under the 
hegemony of the Radical Party. 
Splits ln The Left 
The Radical Party was able to assert its 
leadership, largely, because of the con-
tinual factional warfare within the Left 
movement. The Socialist Party and Com-
munist Party had carried on a constant 
fight for control of the trade-unions and 
vied with each other for posts in the 
Popular Front governments. They also 
held ideological differences, particularly, 
on international questions. The Socialists, 
for instance, tried to oust the Commun-
ists from the government because the 
Communists supported the Soviet 
Union-German Non-Aggression Pact of 
1939. Unsue<;:essful in this effort the 
Socialists temporarily withdrew from the 
coalition in 1941. 
The immediate post-war years wit-
nessed a deeper split in the leadership of 
the Chilean Left . The demands of the 
wartime economy had served to delay 
the crisis which had jolted the Chilean 
·\·, ·~·\~ · · \ f • 1,. · t: ·\ .•n<,: 1: . rt •-- ... :~ 't )-..•i: i i·-:.. :~~ri,d 
·(: :.:( ,ine l r"'i t.::--e u n :-- •ab lr- lund11i on :> ~ti-
rnu'..it t·d i:1dl'per.de nt \'I. Urke rs struggles 
which reached a climax with the killing of 
,ix 1'1.nrk,·rs du ri ng a dernu n,trJtion in 
~u ppor t 0 1 a n:t rate wo rker\ strike . . A. 
general st rike was called. In an attempt to 
forestall the strike. the Socialist Party 
leadership was offered posts in the 
government. After some negotiations, 
the Socialists accepted the offer and tried 
to call off the strike. As a consequence. 
the Socialists lost the support of some 
trade-unions to the Communist Party and 
were branded sell-outs by the Commun-
ist Party leadership. 
The 1946 presidential election found 
the Communist Party again in coalition 
with the Radical Party. The Socialists were 
left out of this front. The Front's candi-
date, Conzales Videla, won the election. 
The new government was set up with the 
Communists holding three seats in the 
nine man cabinet. 
Not long after Videla became presi-
dent, he turned against the Communists, 
purged them from the labor movement, 
and prohibited their participation in 
national life . This attitude was largely a 
reflection of the anti-communist cam-
paign led by the United States govern• 
ment. 
The Masses Remain Poor 
One of the Front's most striking fai-
lures was that during the entire period 
from 1938 to 1952 nothing was done 
about land reform . Even large estates 
went untaxed. In 1955, an agricultural 
census indicated that the old property 
relations had remained basically un-
changed, fewer than 10 percent of the 
landowners owned 86 percent of the 
arable land, while 74.6 percent of the 
poor peasants owned only 5.3 percent of 
the land. Furthermore wages of the 
working classes fell from 27 percent to 21 
percent of the national income during 
the years 1940-53. 
It was in the election of 1952 that 
Salvador Allende began his climb to the 
presidency. Although one of the foun-
ders of the Socialist Party, he had gained 
the respect of me mbers of both Left-
wing parties. The Leftist parties were too 
badly split and the masses too demoral-
ized to rally more than 6 percent of the 
vote for Allende. A right-wing dema-
gogue, Carlos Ibanez, who had been the 
Nazi-backed candidate of 1938, swept the 
election. Ibanez had run a very dema-
gogic campaign, but once in office, his 
completely reactionary, anti-working 
class politics became obvious. 
During lbanez 's term, the living condi-
tions of the work ing masses continued to 
worsen . The rate of inflation climbed 
incredibly. The cost of living rose 56 
percent, 70 percent, 80 percent, 40 
percent, and 20 percent, respectively, in 
the years 1953-57. The working-class, 
faced with a rapidly deteriorating econ-
• ' ·.•,. 
in .i'- ; •· .. rh.i 1~ :1 ! i, u~ t;,t .. r~;! ing cia~s. 
In 1953. the l;1bor movement undPr-
went a period of reo rganizat ion , and the 
United Federat ion of Workers (CUT) was 
formed . Thi , ,ig nalPd the growing unity 
within lef tist wo rker's ranks. 
A New Popular Front 
Three years later , the Popular Action 
Front (FRAP) was formed . This time the 
coalition of Socialist and Communist 
parties did not include the middle-class 
dominated Radical Party. FRAP began to 
intensify its efforts to give the working-
class movement new unified leader~hip. 
Criticism was registered aginst the Ibanez 
government for allowing the army to 
forcefully break-up a mass demonstra-
tion of students and workers. The dem-
onstration in which forty to sixty workers 
were killed, was in protest against the 
raising of bus fares. 
By 1958, FRAP had become deeply 
rooted in the urban and rural proletariat 
and it was prepared to launch its greatest 
organized effort. The coalition would run 
Allende for the presidency. 
FRAP's program included agrarian 
reform by expropriation; nationalization 
of banks, insurance companies and the 
petroleum and sugar industries; the 
creation of state-run enterprises and 
mixed public-private companies in heavy 
industry; higher taxation of high in-
comes ; a change of direction in foreign 
trade, particularly with the socialist coun-
tries and other Latin American countries. 
In the election Allende lost to the 
conservative Jorge Alessandri by 35,000 
votes . 
While FRAP continued to build its 
working class base, the Radical Party 
cooperated with president Alessandri in 
his program of expansion and stabiliza-
tion, which resulted in an annual rate of 
inflation of around 40 percent, a rise in 
food prices, the stagnation of industrial 
production and a rash of wage claims. 
A New Middle-Class Party 
As the 1964 election approached, the 
Radical Party, threatened by the mili-
tancy of the proletariat, joined with the 
Conservative and Liberal parties to form 
what was called a " Democratic Front". 
The Liberal and Conservative parties had 
always represented the interest of the 
large-landed proprietors and the indus-
trial and commercial elites. However, the 
coalition collapsed before the campaign 
ended and the Conservatives and Liber-
als supported the Christian Democrat, 
Eduardo Frei. 
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 
was the last born of Chile s major 
political parties. Its ideology was a mix-
ture of paternalism, Christian socialism, 
corporatism and charity. PDC's support 
came, largely, from the urban middle-
classes most of which had formerly 
supported the Radical Party. 
(continued on page 7) 
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f r('i \ c Jmp<1 i~n wa, dP~i~n l'd to d1,-
r rC'dit ~RAP among the t'IPCl<Hate. With 
ur to o n(•-milli on dol lar, pPr n10n1h from 
L.'. S. ,ource,, fr ei promised a "Re\C>lu-
tion in Libert y" . and headPd a ma ss ive 
rropa ganda o ffensive whose basic 
me~~age wa, that FRAP meant commun-
ism, and communism meant the end of 
all freedom. Mainly because of these 
scare tactics, Allende lost the election by 
a wide margin , receiving only 38.9 per-
cent of the vote to Frei's 56.1 pe rcent . 
As could be predicted. the PDC's 
popularity grew with the expectations 
c reated by its promises, and declined 
with the realization that it could not 
deliver . As the PDC declined from 1964 
to 1970, the worker's and peasant's 
movements grew both in size and mili-
tancy. Instead of placating the m_asses, 
the limited PDC reforms only convinced 
them of the validity of their struggle and 
of the vulnerability of the ruling class. 
The continued decline in the standard 
of living of the workers gave rise to a 
more militant unified left movement. 
This radicalization was especially marked 
among the peasantry. There were increa-
sing numbers of land occupations by the 
peasants. Peasant unions grew from a few 
thousand members in 1964 to over 
100.000 by 1969. 
Confrontations between striking work-
ers and police were on the rise throu-
ghout the period. In March 1966, police 
killed seven miners and injured twenty-
live at the well known El Teniente mine. 
Police occupied Anaconda's El Salvador 
and Potrilla mines when the miners came 
out in support of the El Teniente workers. 
In November 1967, a twenty-four-hour 
general strike resulted in the mobiliza-
tion of all Chile's troops, including the 
navy and air force . 
In Puerto Montt on March 10, 1969, an 
infamous massacre took place . A thou-
sand homeless poor attempted to use the 
public land in order to build shacks _to 
live in . The repress_ive forces were sent in , 
killing five and wounding thirty-seven. 
By May and June, the army was running 
the trains in an attempt to break a 
railroad worker 's strike. 
In 1970, students joined clerical work-
ers striking for higher wages to meet the 
runaway inflation plaguing Chile 's econ-
omy. Following weeks of confrontations, 
two students were killed and a state of 
emergency was declared. 
It was under conditions of violent class 
struggle that the 1970 election which 
bro ught Allende to power to ok plac~. 
Tht> coalition of Marxist and bourgeois 
partit>s which triumphed was named the 
Popular Unity. 
Allende's victory, in short, was the by-
product of popular frontism in Chile and 
of the new radi calization S\\Pep,ng the 
Chikan ma.,ses. 
U. S. Intervention 
'd ef <' a1. Agdin in 1%9, ac cor din g to the 
~(·rrC't C o lhv 1P'1 irnon y , $500 .000 w ,i~ 
;iuthnr i1(·d b v trw fortv Corrnn:1t ee I J 
~p eu al grour; ing in the \'\h1t e Hou,e, 
including Fo rd, Rockefello w , Ki ssinger 
and others) to "fund individuab who 
could be ~urtured to keep th e anti-
Allende for ces active and intact." 
L.S. military invo lvement in Chile , 
before and during the Allende govern-
ment . took the form of millions of dollars 
in military "aid" and the training of 
military offi cers of all branches. In th e 
past 20 years , over 4,000 Chilean military 
officers have been trained in U.S. 
schools, either in the U.S. or the Panama 
Canal Zone . These include the four 
original members of the fascist junta. The 
Chilean police force, the Carabineros, 
received $2.5 million from the Agency for 
International Development. 
After 1970 - A Frenzied 
Increase of U.S. Intervention 
The Popular Unity plurality in 1970 sent 
the U.S. agents in Chile into a frenzy. The 
subversive plan hatched by ITT and the 
CIA in 1970, which was exposed by Jack 
Anderson in March 1972, was carried out 
to the letter. As the Allende government 
moved to return copper and other 
monopolized wealth of Chile to the 
people of Chile, the ITT-CIA plan of 
" destabilization" went into effect. The 
plan included creating economi_c chaos 
while at the same time funding the 
regular military and terrorist right wing 
groups to prepare a military c<?up. Wh~n 
the UP government increased its plurality 
in the March 1973 elections, the U .S. plan 
for a violent overthrow was stepped up. 
The 2 billion dollar Chilean debt, owed 
mostly to U.S. sources, was accumulated 
by pre-UP governments , especially the 
Christian Democrats. The World Bank 
refused Allende 's plea to renegoitate the 
debt, and the U.S. cut commercial credits 
drastically (down to $3 million) , but 
greatly increased military "aid" to $45.5 
millions. 
To quote the Sun Times, 9-8-74, "Th_e 
Forty Comrnittee authorized a~- a~d1-
tional $5 million for more destab1ltzat1on 
efforts during the period from 1971 to 
1973." The CIA plan called first for 
bribing the Chilean congressmen not to 
name Allende as President. When that 
didn't work, the ITT-CIA plan called for a 
military uprising by right-wing officers to 
prevent Allende's inauguration. In Oc-
tober 1970, Gen. Schneider, the Com-
mander-in-Chief who respected the 
constitution, was assassinated. However, 
a general strike by labor stopped the 
fascists and Allende was inaugurated. The 
plan then called for heavy financial 
support of the virulent anti-UP press (e/ 
fvfr>rcurio), for an undeclared blockade 
and economic war by the U.S. to strangle 
the dep endent Chilean econo my ; organ-
( i • ,· · . : · '1f Jt ·1 • ,< I ) tl 1 t · • ,: · t · ci·-- 1 :,· , , , .,._ \;:,-(' 
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L.ilm r Dt·v c·lopnwnt) to o rgani zt· anti -L,P 
trade as~o ciat,ons and " union," to t all 
po litical ~trike~ to rara ly~e th e C' co nomy ; 
enco uragPmPnt of .-mo u~e o f agents 
provocateurs in " ultra-left" _groups to 
also provoke strikes and to frighten th.e 
middle class by unauthorized nat1onal1-
zat ion of small businesses. The final 
pr eparation was the mass assassinations 
of loyalist military office rs, leading to the 
final, fascist military coup. 
U.S . Role in 
The Military Coup 
Mrs. Hortensia Allende, widow of the 
President , revealed the direC1 military 
role of the U.S. in the Sept. 11 , 197Jcoup. 
Speaking to the Conference on "CIA 
AND WORLD PEACE" held April 5, 1975_ 
at Yale University, Mrs. Allende cited the 
presence of U.S. warsh ips in Chilean 
waters immediately before and after the 
coup . She described the arrival of 32 U.S. 
observation and battle planes on the 
Chilean border at Mendoza, Argentina, 
and the arrival of 150 U.S. "specialists in 
air acrobatics" in Chile - all this just days 
before the coup. U.S. air force Majors V. 
Duenas and T. Schull, according to Mrs. 
Allende, piloted their plane no. WB-575, 
plate no. 631-2398, in the battle zones 
during the Chilean coup. Their plane was_ 
a fl ying electronic control station and was 
used to coordinate the junta 's military 
communications. 
The Chilean experience is one of the 
most shameful chapters in U.S. for_eign 
policy. We can learn from the events in 
Chile that the U.S. imperialists will not 
even allow a people to choose socialism 
as an answer to their problems if it is not 
in the interest of the U.S. capitalists. But 
this temporary set back will not live long, 
because the people of Chile are showing 
new strer.gth in their struggle against 
fascism. History has proven to be on the 
side of people wanting to be free. 
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Chile's Experience 
social transformations and growing re-
sistance of the bourgeoisie; the strategic 
- the strengthening of the alliance of 
democratic forces, and first of all the 
alliance with the middle urban segments, 
the forming of a social army of the 
revolution. 
It should be noted , however, that there 
was no theoretical elaboration and politi-
cal substantiation of the ways, forms and 
methods of solving these key problems 
and this had a negative effect on the 
entire development of the struggle. !..eft-
wing extremists contended that a direct 
stage of the socialist revolution had 
started, that an offensive against the 
bourgeoisie as a whole had started and 
for this reason arbitrarily carried out 
adventuristic expropriations. 
The Communist Party of Chile held a 
correct position, saying that there still 
remained unsolved some tasks of the 
anti-imperialist, antioligarchic revolu-
tion. But there was no clear-cut substan-
tiation of the roads and methods of the 
speediest attainment of these tasks. 
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th(:rmcl~c~~ of the imperialist yoke. 
Each year the forces of world revolu-
tion : the socialist countries , the national 
liberation movements in the developing 
rountries. and the anti-monopoly forces 
in the capitalist countries grow stronger. 
This year, May Day took on a spe.cia 1 
meaning with the victories in lndo-
China. This year, the celebration belongs 
to the patriotic liberation forces in South 
East Asia, particularly the Vietnamese 
people who have suffered from and 
resisted so long the Chinese , Japanese, 
French and United States aggression. 
Meanwhile it was only this road and 
by pursuing a very flexible policy that 
would rule out Leftist adventurism that it 
could be possible to strengthen the 
alliance of the working class with the 
middle layers and ensure the revolution's 
advance . But no such clarity was intro-
duced into politics . The revolution was 
marking time. Reaction stepped u_p its 
activities and somewhere at the close of 
1972 began to switch to the offensive. In 
many instances the revolutionary forces 
did not hold a vigorously offensive stand 
in respect to the reactionary circles. This 
was one of the crucial miscalculations 
made by the Popular Unity coalition . 
A fierce class struggle started in the 
country in all fields - political. economic 
and ideological. The struggle for power 
was exceptionally tense. Allende 's victory 
signified the creation of a revolutionary-
democratic government but it did not 
enjoy full power. And the cardinal 
question of the revolution - the esta-
blishment of popular, democratic power 
- was not solved. 
There were two centers of power in 
the country ; the popular one that con-
centrated in its· hands mostly the execut-
ive power in the person of President 
Allende and his government, and a 
reactionary center that held in its hands 
legislative power, the judiciary, most of 
the state apparatus and the mass media. 
Reaction used bourgeois constitution-
alism and legality, all levers of parliamen-
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carrying th<' Hars of napalm. \\'e c.innot 
forget the couragc>ous strength of the~e 
pPorle . nor the de~tructive role of our 
government. 
The victories in Southea~t Asia are of 
true hi~torical ~ignificance, because thf'Y 
dealt a tremendo us blow against r arism 
and imperialist brutality . All anti-
imperialist forces join in solidarity with 
the people of Inda-China . and also 
applaud the unswerving support from 
the socialist countries . especially the 
support given by the Soviet Union which 
was critical for these victories. 
tary power and the judiciary to limit to 
the minimum the transforming activities 
of the executive power under the guise 
of observing legality and then to paralyze 
it. At the same time, reaction violated all 
norms of legality. 
React ion carried the class struggle 
bevond the framework of constitutional-
is~ and legality. At the same time the 
Allend e government could not transgress 
the framework of constitutionalism in its 
actions to suppress the unlawful actions 
of the class enemy . Loyalt y to bourg·eois 
constitutionalism was determined by the 
coalition's program documents. There 
was still another factor - the army. It was 
an important political force. As to its legal 
neutralization , it was ensured by the 
concept of constitutionalism of adminis-
tration. 
Being fettered by these circumstances, 
the Allende government actually left 
inatct the bourgeois state apparatus and 
the judiciary which sabotaged the popu-
lar government's undertakings. Using 
this, the reaction mustered its forces and 
prepared for an offensive. 
The Allende governments' measures 
against reaction , including its fascist 
wing . were of little effect . The entire 
complexity of the political situation was 
that because of wrong political steps the 
correct course - to avoid civil war -
brought closer civil war in its most 
dangerous form for the revolution , in the 
form of a military-fascist coup. 
Edilori.il Bo.ird 
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